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At a time in which the closely watched cases reaching the
Supreme Court tend to involve novel issues under the Bill of
Rights or important federal statutory questions that have
produced conflicts in the lower courts, one important category of
cases on the Court’s docket often goes unnoticed: those
involving the Court’s original jurisdiction over disputes between
States. Original jurisdiction at the Supreme Court is somewhat
of an oddity, in that the Court must act as both the trial court and
the court of last resort in deciding these matters—an unusual
posture for a Court that rarely resolves discovery disputes, takes
live testimony, or makes original findings of fact. But the unique
structure of our federalist form of government—with
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1. Sup. Ct. R. 17(2) (providing also that “[t]he form of pleadings and motions
prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is followed” in original actions).
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subordinate sovereigns losing some aspects of their separate
sovereignty upon joining the union but retaining others—called
for a unique judicial structure in which disputes between these
subordinate sovereigns could be resolved in a way that avoided
the partisan state court systems and accorded the States the
dignity to which their sovereign status entitled them.
Although Article III also created other bases for the Court’s
original jurisdiction, this article focuses on disputes between
States, which from the inception have been the mainstay of the
Court’s original jurisdiction jurisprudence, and have represented
the strain of Article III power consistently reserved for exclusive
resolution by the Court. Several features of the Court’s original
jurisdiction distinguish it from the Court’s “appellate” docket—
a term that is used broadly to describe its review of cases
originating in the lower federal courts or the state courts, and
that includes both the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction and, in
earlier years, appeals as of right in certain categories of cases.
First, the history of, and rationale for, the Court’s original
jurisdiction are central to the manner in which the Court has
defined the contours of the jurisdiction. Part II of this article
explores the background of the grant of original jurisdiction in
Article III, the manner in which that grant has been construed
and defined in disputes between States, and the early history of
the Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction. As this history
shows, the Court consistently has given great weight to the
historical and structural rationale for its original jurisdiction in
determining how that jurisdictional grant should be exercised
and applied.
Second, in part because of this historical and structural
context, the Court’s original jurisdiction has produced very
different issues and rules than has its ordinary appellate docket.
Because the very nature of original jurisdiction requires the
Court to act as a trial court and as a court of last resort, the rules
for such cases are very different from either type of jurisdiction
standing alone. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, are said to serve as
“guides,”1 but the Court is not bound to follow them, and a State
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seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction must seek the Court’s
leave to do so.2 Further, the intensely time-consuming
responsibilities of the trial court role create the potential that
original jurisdiction cases could occupy an inordinate portion of
the Court’s limited resources, and could involve the Court in
managing petty disputes between the States or their constituents.
For precisely these reasons, the Court has guarded its original
jurisdiction carefully, reserving the “delicate and grave”3
exercise of that jurisdiction for the narrow class of disputes that
truly implicate the concerns that necessitated the constitutional
grant. And to address the practical concerns, the Court
frequently appoints Special Masters to assist with these cases.4
Part III discusses some of these unique issues and practical
concerns and the manner in which the Court has addressed them.
II. THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF THE COURT’S
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

11/15/2017 09:50:50

2. Sup. Ct. R. 17(3) (providing that “[t]he initial pleading shall be preceded by a motion
for leave to file”).
3. La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900) (refusing to exercise original jurisdiction because
the case was not in substance a controversy between states: original jurisdiction should be
exercised only when “the necessity [i]s absolute and the matter in itself properly
justiciable”); see also S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. 256, 267 (2010) (indicating that the Court will
exercise its original jurisdiction “sparingly” and will “retain substantial discretion to decide
whether a particular claim requires an original forum” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4. See, e.g., S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. at 259 (noting that case had first been referred to a
special master).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution states that the
“judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”5 Article III, Section 2,
itemizes the specific categories of cases to which the “judicial
Power” shall extend, including “Controversies between two or
more States,” and goes on to state that “[i]n all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a Party, the supreme court shall have
original jurisdiction.”6
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7. WILLIAM. H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 31 (2001); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 551 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961) (asserting that
“the expressions ‘appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact,’ do not necessarily imply a
re-examination in the supreme court of facts decided by juries in the inferior courts”).
8. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *231 (1809) (indicating that the
privy council acted as a “court of appeal” in some cases, and that appeal to the king himself
was also possible).
9. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Wis. v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888),
overruled in part by Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
10. Even the current borders between some of the states continue to be guided by royal
charters, except that now these charters are interpreted by the Supreme Court instead of the
crown. See, e.g., Ga. v. S.C., 497 U.S. 376, 380–81 (1990) (noting that the boundary
between the two states, originally defined in 1732 by letters patent issued by the crown,
was clarified in the 1787 Treaty of Beaufort, which continues to define the boundary).

39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 16 Side B

The term “original” jurisdiction is distinguished from
“appellate” jurisdiction. It means that the Court has “the power
to hear and decide a lawsuit in the first instance”—in other
words, to act as a trial court—whereas “appellate” denotes the
power “to review the judgment of another court that has already
heard the lawsuit in the first instance.”7 The distinction between
“original” and “appellate” jurisdiction was a settled feature of
English law at the time the Constitution was adopted.8 William
Blackstone used the term “original jurisdiction” to describe the
role of the king to resolve disputes between American provinces
over the “extent of their charters” or similar matters: “Whenever
also a question arises between two provinces in America, or
elsewhere, as concerning the extent of their charters and the like,
the king in his council exercises original jurisdiction therein,
upon the principles of [feudal] sovereignty.”9 Although of
course this type of original jurisdiction would not be the same as
that exercised by the Court under Article III—given that the
king, as the source of the charters that created certain rights
(including boundaries) for American provinces before the
Revolution, naturally would have been called upon to interpret
those charters so long as England controlled the colonies—the
reference nonetheless would have provided a model for similar
resolution by a Supreme Court, particularly given that some
royal charters continued to be relevant to such matters as
boundaries even after the Constitution was ratified.10
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The original jurisdiction bestowed on the Supreme Court
was indeed of a different character than that exercised by the
crown, and was crucial to the Constitutional design. At the time
the Constitution was ratified, and under the Articles of
Confederation, each state was sovereign in its own right, subject
only to powers “expressly delegated” to Congress.11 The
Articles did not provide for any federal judiciary or for a
Supreme Court,12 and any disputes between states over
“boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes whatever” were to be
resolved by Congress, which was directed to convene a court to
resolve such disputes under its auspices.13
Early drafts of Article III of the Constitution would have
vested all original jurisdiction in state courts,14 but the framers
quickly came to the view that state court jurisdiction would not
be satisfactory for certain important categories of cases—either
because state courts might entertain biases in favor of their own
citizens or local governments, or because certain disputes might
implicate national interests at the highest level. After several
rounds of drafts, the final version of Article III conferred
original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court over disputes
between States and other important categories of cases.15
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11. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, Art. II (1877) (“Each State retains its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton) at 130 (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) at 143 (J.E. Cook ed., 1961)
(complaining of “[a] circumstance, which crowns the defects of the confederation . . . the
want of a judiciary power”).
13. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, Art. IX (1877) (“The United States in Congress
assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now
subsisting, or that hereafter may arise, between two or more states concerning boundary,
jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever.”). The Articles also provided for procedures by
which such disputes would be presented to and resolved by Congress. Id.; see generally
Mo. v. Ill., 180 U.S. 208, 220–21 (1901) (quoting Articles of Confederation).
14. J.E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party
Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 620 (1994) (tracing the “progression of the drafts, from one
that vested all original jurisdiction in state courts to one that conferred original jurisdiction
directly upon the Court,” and concluding that “the grant was predicated on distrust of state
courts and a preference for original cognizance in the federal courts”).
15. Id.; see also Mo. v. Ill., 180 U.S. at 221–24 (following language through proposals
and drafts).
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B. Rationale Behind Original Jurisdiction for State Disputes

See, e.g., Ga. v. Penn. R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) at 538 (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 7, at 548.
143 U.S. 621 (1862).

11/15/2017 09:50:50

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 17 Side B

The context of the States’ entry into the United States
makes clear why the Court’s original jurisdiction was so crucial.
Before the formation of the federal union, the states were
separate sovereigns, and, as such, had at least the theoretical
ability to resolve disputes among themselves by war or
negotiation.16 When the states ratified the Constitution and
thereby joined the Union, they expressly relinquished these
customary international law means for settling disagreements
among sovereigns. Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution
states that “[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation,” and that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent
of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, . . . or engage in War.”17 By agreeing to these
restrictions, the States gave up a significant part of their ability
to resolve any differences that might arise between them, and it
was essential that the Constitution provide them an alternative
means of resolving disputes that would not require the use of the
courts of one of the involved states—because, as Alexander
Hamilton explained, “no man ought certainly to be a judge in his
own cause”18—and that would properly recognize the dignity
and sovereignty of each involved State. As Hamilton further
noted, it would “ill suit [the] dignity [of the states] to be turned
over to an inferior tribunal.”19
For this reason, it was essential to the States and to the
preservation of the Union that a mechanism be provided to
resolve disputes that already existed, and inevitably would arise
in the future, between and among the States. As the Court
recounted in United States v. Texas,20 at the time the
Constitution was adopted, there already were controversies
between eleven states as to their boundaries, which disputes
“had continued from the first settlement of the colonies,” and it
was deemed essential to have a national tribunal “for the
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settlement of these and like controversies that might arise.”21
Article III delegated this role to the Supreme Court, as a
superior, national tribunal to “match the dignity of the parties to
the status of the court.”22 As the Court explained in Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, a complaining state,
[b]ound hand and foot by the prohibitions of the
[C]onstitution . . . can neither treat, agree, or fight with its
adversary, without the consent of [C]ongress: a resort to the
judicial power is the only means left for legally adjusting,
or persuading a state which has possession of disputed
territory, to enter into an agreement or compact, relating to
23
a controverted boundary.

Article III established the Supreme Court as the impartial forum
for the States, to accord them the dignity of sovereigns and serve
as a “substitute for the diplomatic settlement of controversies
between sovereigns and a possible resort to force.”24 By
consenting to the Constitution, the States agreed to this method
of resolving any disputes between them, and thereby gave up
part of their sovereign right to be immune from suit.25
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21. Id. at 625; see also R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723–24 (1838) (describing
nature of disputes).
22. Cal. v. Ariz., 440 U.S. 59, 65–66 (1979). Professor Pfander advocates the view that
the true purpose of the original jurisdiction clause of Article III was not to provide a
dignified forum, but rather to ensure that federal law would be enforced against the States.
Pfander, supra n. 14, at 558. Professor Amar advocates an alternative view—that the
Court’s original jurisdiction was largely driven by a desire to establish a geographically
convenient and neutral forum for States and foreign diplomats. Akhil Reed Amar,
Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 443 469–78, 489–90 (1989). A full analysis of these competing views is beyond the
scope of this article.
23. R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. at 726 (noting that “[f]ew, if any, will be made, when it is left
to the pleasure of the state in possession; but when it is known that some tribunal can
decide on the right, it is most probable that controversies will be settled by compact”).
24. Kan. v. Neb., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1052 (2015) (recognizing “inherent
authority, as part of the Constitution’s grant of original jurisdiction, to equitably apportion
interstate streams between States,” and exercising original jurisdiction in action seeking to
allow Nebraska to appropriate more water than interstate compact originally allowed).
25. See, e.g., R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. at 720–21.
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C. Congress’s Power with Respect to the Court’s
Original Jurisdiction
The text of Article III significantly curtails the power of
Congress to limit or expand the Court’s original jurisdiction.
Article III, Section 2, states that the Court “shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”26 This last
clause has long been read to allow Congress to limit and
otherwise define the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.27 Yet no such
caveat qualifies the grant of original jurisdiction, which states
broadly that “[i]n all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a
Party, the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.”28
Based on this clear textual distinction between the two heads of
the Court’s jurisdiction, it has long been held that the original
jurisdiction is “self-executing and unassailable by Congress”29—
in the sense that “in all cases where original jurisdiction is given
by the Constitution,” the Supreme Court “has authority to
exercise it without any further act of Congress to . . .
confer jurisdiction.”30

39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 18 Side B
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26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
27. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 7, at 552; The Francis Wright, 105
U.S. 381, 386 (1881); Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514–15 (1869). The extent of
Congress’s power to limit the Court’s appellate jurisdiction on specific subject matters has
been the subject of some academic debate, see generally Julian Velasco, Congressional
Control Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View, 46 Cath. U.
L. Rev. 671 (1997), but that issue is beyond the scope of this article.
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
29. Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special
Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 632
(2002) (citing Chisholm v. Ga., 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)); see also Cal. v. Ariz., 440
U.S. at 65 (indicating that Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is effective automatically
without legislative authority); Fla. v. Ga., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 492 (1854) (stating that
“the omission to legislate on the subject could not deprive the court of the jurisdiction
conferred . . . and in the absence of any legislation by congress, the court itself was
authorized to prescribe its mode and form of proceeding, so as to accomplish the ends for
which the jurisdiction was given”).
30. Ky. v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 98 (1861), overruled on other grounds by
P.R. v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 230 (1987) (declaring that “Kentucky v. Dennison is the
product of another time” and “may stand no longer”).
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The seminal case of Marbury v. Madison31 was the first to
enforce this understanding by holding unconstitutional a part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 that purported to grant the Supreme
Court the power to issue writs of mandamus. After concluding
that the issuance of such a writ necessarily would be an act of
“original”—and not “appellate”—jurisdiction, Justice Marshall
declared that Congress could not constitutionally grant such
power, as the mandamus power was not among those
enumerated in Article III as part of the Court’s original
jurisdiction.32 And because Marbury was neither an ambassador
nor a State, he was not entitled to invoke the Court’s original
jurisdiction.33 The Court found that this aspect of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 conflicted with the Constitution and was therefore
unconstitutional—famously establishing for the first time the
Court’s power to strike down an act of Congress as inconsistent
with the Constitution.34
Although the Court repeatedly has stated that Congress
may not limit or expand the Court’s original jurisdiction, it long
has been understood that Congress may make certain aspects of
the Court’s original jurisdiction concurrent with that of the state
or lower federal courts—a point not directly addressed by the
text of Article III.35 Congress enacted this understanding in the
first Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided that the Court would
have exclusive and original jurisdiction over “all controversies
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 19 Side A
11/15/2017 09:50:50

31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
32. Id. at 174 (“If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction,
where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original
jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of
jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.”).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 189 (“Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.”).
35. See, e.g., Ames v. Kan., 111 U.S. 449, 469 (1884) (acknowledging that Court is
“unable to say that it is not within the power of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of
the United States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the
constitution with original jurisdiction.”). A frequently noted dictum in Marbury, 5 U.S. at
174, could be read to suggest that the Court’s original jurisdiction in its entirety was
exclusive of the states, but that has never been the understanding adopted by Congress or
later decisions of the Court. See generally Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, David L.
Shapiro & Herbert Wechsler, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 242–44 (2d ed. 1973).
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36. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73, § 13 (Sept.
24, 1789) [hereinafter 1789 Act].
37. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
39. Bऺrs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 260 (1884).
40. Ames, 111 U.S. at 464.
41. 1789 Act, supra note 36, at 73, § 13.

39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 19 Side B

of a civil nature, where a state is a party” and over any actions or
proceedings against ambassadors or foreign officials36—and
original but nonexclusive jurisdiction over controversies
between a state and citizens of another state or actions brought
by ambassadors or foreign officials.37 The current version of this
provision further narrows the cases as to which the Court’s
original jurisdiction shall be “exclusive,” limiting that class to
“all controversies between two or more states.”38 In 1884, the
Court held that the then-extant provisions for nonexclusive
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court were consistent with the text
of Article III—which the Court found was meant to reserve the
Court’s original jurisdiction for matters carrying a high level of
importance, not to require it to hear “a petty claim of even less
than five dollars” merely because the defendant “had been
clothed by some foreign government with the consular office,”39
or to require a State or an ambassador to present any and all
grievances in “this one tribunal.”40 Congress’s consistent
provision for concurrent original jurisdiction over broad
categories of subjects identified in Article III as part of the
Court’s original jurisdiction has significantly narrowed the range
of matters over which the Court finds it appropriate to exercise
that jurisdiction.
Consistent with the nonexclusive nature of certain heads of
the Court’s original jurisdiction, the Court has imposed its own
limitations on the scope of that jurisdiction. Although the literal
text of Article III would appear to authorize original jurisdiction
over criminal cases—because a State is almost always a party to
such cases—and although Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789
provided for nonexclusive original jurisdiction over civil
controversies between a State and citizens of other States,41 the
Court made clear in early cases that it had no power to entertain
an action by a State to enforce its own penal statutes, even
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where the State sought some form of civil penalty.42 The Court
cited the longstanding rule, grounded in English precedents and
in international law, that a sovereign cannot enforce the penal
statutes of another sovereign.43
The Court also has clarified other aspects of original
jurisdiction, particularly as it relates to the relationships of the
parties. The Court has held that it has original, nonexclusive
jurisdiction over cases between a State and the United States,44
but that the original jurisdiction does not extend to cases
between States and federal agencies.45 Congress has codified
these holdings by providing that the Supreme Court has original
but not exclusive jurisdiction over controversies between the
United States and a State, actions by a State against the citizens
of another State, and proceedings involving ambassadors or
foreign consuls.46
III. ORIGINAL ACTIONS BETWEEN STATES
One aspect of the Court’s original jurisdiction that has been
a constant over the years is its role of deciding “Controversies
between two or more States”47—an aspect of the Court’s
original jurisdiction that both the Court and Congress have
consistently deemed exclusive of other courts. The Court has
read the text of Article III to require exclusive jurisdiction over
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 20 Side A
11/15/2017 09:50:50

42. See, e.g., Pelican Insurance, 127 U.S. at 290–94 (discussing early precedents).
43. Id. at 289–91 (surveying authorities, among them The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825), in which Chief Justice Marshall famously declared that “the courts
of no country execute the penal laws of another”); see also Ga. v. Pa. R. Co., 324 U.S. 439,
446 (1945) (recognizing that original jurisdiction does not allow States to bring claims for
the enforcement of State penal statutes).
44. See, e.g., U.S. v. La., 339 U.S. 699, 700 (1950) (recognizing the rights of the United
States against Louisiana for property along the State’s coast); U.S. v. Tex., 143 U.S. 621,
643–46 (1892) (reasoning that the presence of a State in the dispute supports original
jurisdiction and that the presence of the United States creates federal judicial power).
45. See, e.g., Tex. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 258 U.S. 158, 160 (1922) (refusing
to exercise original jurisdiction over a claim by a State against two federal agencies
because the defendants were not “citizens of any state, but ha[d] the same relation to one
state as to another”).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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disputes between two or more States,48 and Congress—from the
first Judiciary Act to the present—has never tested the question
by providing for anything other than exclusive jurisdiction over
such cases, as reflected in the current codification of the rule.49
The exclusivity of the constitutional grant was closely bound up
with the Court’s conclusion—reached early in its original
jurisdiction jurisprudence—that States did not enjoy sovereign
immunity from the exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction
over controversies with other States.50 The Court held that, in
light of the history and rationale underlying the original
jurisdiction clause, the States implicitly waived the relevant
aspects of their sovereign immunity when they ratified the
Constitution and agreed to the dispute resolution mechanism
provided by Article III.51
A. Early Cases: Boundary Controversies Between States
Over the years, disputes between States have represented
the vast majority of the Court’s original jurisdiction cases, and
also likely would be viewed as the most important. But even so,
the numbers are small: by the 1990s, the Court had entertained
and decided only about 170 original jurisdiction cases.52 Many
of the earliest such cases—including the first reported original
jurisdiction case, New York v. Connecticut—involved property
disputes or controversies over interstate boundaries.53 The two
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 20 Side B
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48. See, e.g., La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900) (“[B]y the Constitution and according
to the statute, the original jurisdiction of this court is exclusive over suits between states,
though not exclusive over those between a state and citizens of another state.”).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a); see also Miss. v. La., 506 U.S. 73, 76–78 (1992) (discussing
early cases and concluding that “the description of our jurisdiction as ‘exclusive’
necessarily denies jurisdiction of such cases to any other federal court”); Cal. v. Ariz., 440
U.S. at 63 (noting that “a district court could not hear [California’s] claims against Arizona,
because this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims”).
50. See, e.g., R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. at 720–21.
51. Id.
52. See generally Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court,
11 STAN. L. REV. 665 (1959) (indicating that 123 cases had been decided by 1959,
discussing relevant law, and providing list of cases) [hereinafter Stanford Note]. Based on
the Court’s docket and numbering system, the author estimates that about forty-seven
additional cases have been filed since the count reported in the Stanford Note.
53. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1, 2 (1799); see also Mo. v. Ky., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 395 (1870); Va.
v. W. Va., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 39 (1870); Ala. v. Ga., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 505 (1860); Fla. v.
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States in that first case had entered into an agreement granting
certain lands to New York,54 but Connecticut then conveyed the
same land to private individuals and obtained an injunction in its
own courts to enforce the grant.55 The case thus involved not the
boundary between States, but “the right of soil, which . . . results
from the right of jurisdiction.”56 The Supreme Court refused to
uphold the injunction, holding that New York’s absence in the
prior state court proceeding deprived it of a fair adjudication.57
As the Court observed in 1888, the “most numerous class”
of original cases entertained by the Court consisted of
controversies between two states as to the boundaries of
their territory, such as were determined before the
Revolution by the king in council, and under the Articles of
Confederation (while there was no national judiciary) by
58
committees or commissioners appointed by congress.

Indeed, the Court noted that “[t]he books of reports contain but
few other cases in which the aid of this court has been invoked
in controversies between two states.”59
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Ga., 58 U.S. 478; Mo. v. Iowa, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 660 (1849); R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. 657;
N.J. v. N.Y., 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 284 (1831).
54. N.Y. v. Conn., 4 U.S. at 3.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id. at 6 (explaining that, “as the State of New York was not a party to the suits
below, nor interested in the decision of those suits, an injunction ought not to issue”).
58. Pelican Insurance, 127 U.S. at 288.
59. Id. (citations omitted); see also La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. at 18 (noting that, “[a]s might
be expected in view of the nature of the jurisdiction, the cases are few in which the aid of
the court has been sought in ‘controversies between two or more States,’” and also
recognizing that they were “chiefly controversies as to boundaries” (citing Pelican
Insurance)). In addition to addressing boundaries, a handful of early interstate cases
addressed the payment of bonds and the enforcement of quarantine regulations. See, e.g.,
S.D. v. N.C., 192 U.S. 286, 321 (1904) (enforcing North Carolina’s obligation to pay on
bonds to South Dakota); La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. at 22–23 (dismissing for lack of original
jurisdiction because the facts did not support the claim that one State authorized its health
officer to issue a quarantine that “place[d] an embargo in fact on all interstate commerce
between the state of Louisiana and the state of Texas”); N.H. v. La., 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883)
(denying original jurisdiction on New Hampshire’s claims for debts on behalf of private
individuals against Louisiana).
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B. Expansion of Court’s Jurisdiction Beyond Boundary Cases
It is not surprising that most of the Court’s early disputes
between states addressed boundary disputes and related issues.
Not only were there a large number of such disputes brewing at
the time the Constitution was adopted,60 but there existed early
in the Court’s jurisprudence a strong view that a State’s right to
invoke the Court’s jurisdiction did not extend to suits in which
the State sought to vindicate the rights of its citizens—that is, to
act as parens patriae61—but rather encompassed only cases in
which the State asserted rights affecting “the property or the
powers of the complaining state in its sovereign or corporate
capacity.”62 Of course, boundary disputes were of precisely such
a proprietary character, so it is not surprising that no question
was raised but that such disputes fell squarely within the
jurisdictional grant.63 It was only in 1900 that the Court first
suggested, in Louisiana v. Texas, that the jurisdiction might
permit a State to represent the interests of its citizens in a parens
patriae capacity.64 The Court firmly embraced that conclusion

39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 21 Side B
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60. See, e.g., U.S. v. Tex., 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
61. Literally, “parent of the country.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979)
(defining parens patriae as “a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign
interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people, interstate water rights, general
economy of the state,” and the like).
62. La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“When the Constitution gave
this court jurisdiction of controversies between states, it did not thereby authorize a state to
bring another state to the bar of this court for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of
local statutes or regulations that do not affect the property or the powers of the complaining
state in its sovereign or corporate capacity, but which at most affect only the rights of
individual citizens or corporations engaged in interstate commerce.”).
63. U.S. v. Tex., 143 U.S. at 640 (“[T]hat a controversy between two or more states, in
respect to boundary, is one to which, under the constitution, such judicial power extends, is
no longer an open question in this court.”).
64. La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. at 19 (recognizing that Louisiana believed itself “entitled to
seek relief in this way because the matters complained of affect her citizens at large,” but
also recognizing that “if the case stated is not one presenting a controversy between these
states, the exercise of original jurisdiction by this court as against the state of Texas cannot
be maintained”). The Court ultimately did not pass on Louisiana’s claimed right to proceed
in a parens patriae capacity, finding that the action did not involve a justiciable dispute
between the States. Id. at 22–23 (asserting that “this bill does not set up facts which show
that the state of Texas has so authorized or confirmed the alleged action of her health
officer as to make it her own, or from which it necessarily follows that the two states are in
controversy within the meaning of the Constitution”). In earlier cases, the Court had
declined to decide whether a complaining State had to assert its own proprietary interests,
rather than more general sovereign interests or the interests of its citizens. In South
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the following year in Missouri v. Illinois.65 Missouri filed that
action against Illinois and the Sanitary District of the City of
Chicago, complaining that Chicago was disposing of waste that
was finding its way down the Mississippi River, to the detriment
of citizens of Missouri who owned property along the river. The
Court rejected the contention that the action was not within the
cognizance of the Court’s original jurisdiction, holding that “if
the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a state are
threatened, the state is the proper party to represent and defend
them.”66 This was a significant expansion of the powers that the
Court previously had exercised—such as in boundary and
property disputes—where the States’ own proprietary interests
were at stake. And by permitting the State of Missouri to
proceed with its action, the Court entertained its first interstate
pollution abatement case.67
C. Court’s Discretion to Decline Original Jurisdiction

11/15/2017 09:50:50

Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 4 (1876), South Carolina sought to enjoin Georgia, the
Secretary of War, and others, from “obstructing or interrupting” the navigation of the
Savannah River. In dismissing the bill for want of any showing of an unlawful obstruction,
the Court reserved the question whether a State, in asserting such a claim, must “aver and
show that it will sustain some special and peculiar injury therefrom, and such as would
enable a private person to maintain a similar action in another court.” Id. at 14. In
Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379 (1877), the Court did not address the contention that it
could “take cognizance of no question which concerns alone the rights of a State in her
political or sovereign character; that to sustain the suit she must have some proprietary
interest which is affected by the defendant.” Id. at 382.
65. 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
66. Id. at 241.
67. The subsequent proceedings, reported in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906),
are discussed below.
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As the Court began to expand the class of cases that it
deemed properly within its original jurisdiction, an important
question arose as to whether Court had discretion to decline
jurisdiction over a matter that otherwise qualified for original
jurisdiction under Article III and the governing statute. Not
surprisingly, given the burden on the Court’s docket that might
otherwise have resulted, the Court’s answer to that question was
yes—even in cases, such as controversies between States, in
which its jurisdiction was deemed exclusive of the state or lower
federal courts. In 1900, the Court explained in Louisiana v.
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68. La. v. Tex., 176 U.S. at 15.
69. See Miss. v. La., 506 U.S. at 76 (1992); Wyo. v. Okla., 502 U.S. 437, 450 (1992);
Md. v. La., 451 U.S. 725, 739 (1981); Ariz. v. N.M., 425 U.S. 794, 796 (1976).
70. Tex. v. N.M., 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983).
71. Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
72. See Miss. v. La., 506 U.S. at 77 (citing Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S.
493 (1971), and U.S. v. Nev., 412 U.S. 534 (1973)).
73. See id. at 77 (citing Ariz. v. N.M., 425 U.S. 794 (1976), Cal. v. W. Va., 454 U.S.
1027 (1981), and Tex. v. N.M., 462 U.S. 554 (1983)).
74. See id. at 77 (1992) (describing factors).
75. Id. (quoting Mass. v. Mo., 308 U.S. 1, 18 (1939)).
76. Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93).
77. Id. (quoting Tex. v. N.M., 462 U.S. 554, 571, n.18. (1983)).
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Texas that the original jurisdiction “is of so delicate and grave a
character that it was not contemplated that it would be exercised
save when the necessity was absolute.”68 The Court consistently
has repeated that its original jurisdiction should be exercised
only “sparingly,”69 and has interpreted both Article III and the
operative statute as according the Court “substantial discretion
to make case-by-case judgments as to the practical necessity of
an original forum in this Court,”70 and making original
jurisdiction “obligatory only in appropriate cases.”71
The Court initially exercised its discretion not to accept
original jurisdiction in the context of actions falling within its
nonexclusive original jurisdiction, such as actions by States
against citizens of other States, and actions between the United
States and a State.72 Later, the Court made clear that the same
discretion allowed it to decline jurisdiction even over disputes
between States, in which its original jurisdiction always has
been deemed exclusive.73 The Court has said that its
determination as to whether a case is “appropriate” for original
jurisdiction will be guided by two factors74—both of which
follow directly from the historical rationale for the jurisdiction.
First, the Court looks to “the nature of the interest of the
complaining State,”75 with a focus on the “seriousness and
dignity of the claim,”76 As the Court has explained, “‘[t]he
model case for invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is
a dispute between States of such seriousness that it would
amount to casus belli if the States were fully sovereign.’”77 The
Court also will consider whether an alternative forum is
available in which the controversy can be resolved—a factor
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that, although relevant, will not always be dispositive.78 Both
factors draw upon the historic and structural need for a forum in
which States can resolve their most serious disputes.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURT’S LAWMAKING POWER

One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the states
to each other, is that of equality of right. Each state stands

11/15/2017 09:50:50

78. Id. (citing City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93). In Arizona v. New Mexico, the Court
declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, concluding that a pending state court action
“provide[d] an appropriate forum in which the issues tendered . . . may be litigated.” Ariz.
v. N.M., 425 U.S. at 797.
79. See, e.g., Ga. v. S.C., 257 U.S. 516, 518–19 (1922) (resolving boundary issues
between Georgia and South Carolina by reference to the 1787 Treaty of Beaufort); Ga. v.
S.C., 497 U.S. 376, 380–81 (1990) (finally resolving State boundary by reference to the
same 1787 Treaty, which succeeded 1732 letters patent chartering colony of Georgia).
80. See, e.g., R.I. v. Mass., 37 U.S. at 677, 717–18 (reproducing both argument by
counsel that Congress has the sole power to make federal law to govern such disputes and
Court’s acknowledgement of State’s argument).
81. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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Another important question that arose as the variety of
cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction docket expanded
was whether the Court had the power to make affirmative law in
the course of exercising its original jurisdiction, or whether it
was limited to applying existing state or federal law. This was
not an issue that typically arose in boundary cases, which
generally were governed by a formal document, such as a grant
from the crown or a prior treaty between States, such that the
Court’s principal role was to interpret the document.79
As the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction expanded into areas
not governed by a treaty or some other external source, some
parties argued that Article III was merely a jurisdictional grant
that gave the Court the power to entertain a case, and that the
power to make law to provide a rule of decision was reserved to
Congress—so that if no such law existed to resolve the matter,
the Court was powerless to act.80 The Court ultimately
disagreed, holding in Kansas v. Colorado81 that the Court’s
crucial constitutional role of resolving disputes between States
necessarily meant that the Court may have to fashion “interstate
common law” to reach a resolution, in the absence of other
controlling law:
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on the same level with all the rest. It can impose its own
legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its
own views to none. Yet, whenever . . . the action of one
state reaches, through the agency of natural laws, into the
territory of another state, the question of the extent and the
limitations of the rights of the two states becomes a matter
of justiciable dispute between them, and this court is called
upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize
the equal rights of both and at the same time establish
justice between them. In other words, through these
successive disputes and decisions this court is practically
building up what may not improperly be called interstate
82
common law.”

11/15/2017 09:50:50

82. Id. at 97–98 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 95 (“It does not follow . . . that because Congress cannot determine the rule
which shall control between the two states . . . the controversy ceases to be one of a
justiciable nature.”).
84. See generally Kristin Linsley Myles, South Carolina v. North Carolina: Some
Problems Arising in an East Coast Water Dispute, 12 WYO. L. REV. 3 (2012).
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The Court went so far as to state that its power to fashion federal
common law in this area, being a critical part of its
constitutional power and duty to resolve controversies between
States, extended beyond the limited powers of Congress as
enumerated in Article I.83
It was based on this set of understandings that the Court
began to develop federal common law in one of its most
complex areas of original jurisdiction—that of equitable
apportionment of the waters of an interstate river or waterway.
Although these cases were of enormous importance to the States
involved, and concerned complex issues requiring resolution,
the precedent available to the Court was extremely limited.
Indeed, because there is little existing federal law or other
guidance to resolve water-apportionment matters, and because
by the very nature and purpose of original jurisdiction no one
State’s rules can prevail over another’s, this area perhaps
represents the most expansive manifestation of the Court’s
federal common law powers within the scope of its original
jurisdiction.
From the beginning, the Court made clear that its
jurisdiction to determine the extent of one State’s rights to the
waters of a river over those of another State is very broad.84 In
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Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of

11/15/2017 09:50:50

85. 206 U.S. 46.
86. Id. at 85, 98 (stating, and then expounding upon, common law rule).
87. Id. at 98 (characterizing Colorado’s argument as “extreme” and pointing out that
“the appropriation of the entire flow of the river would naturally tend to make the lands
along the stream in Kansas less arable[,] . . . taking from the adjacent territory that which
had been the customary natural means of preserving its arable character”).
88. Id. at 100.
89. Id. at 98.
90. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
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Kansas v. Colorado,85 one of the earliest such cases to reach the
Court, Kansas challenged Colorado’s diversion of waters of the
Arkansas River to irrigate non-riparian arid lands, and claimed
that under English common law, Kansas was entitled to receive
the flows of the river as they existed “before any human
interference.”86 Colorado, for its part, claimed the right of its
users under its doctrine of prior appropriation to take the entire
flow of the stream, arguing that it had a sovereign right to divert
and use any and all water running through its boundaries,
without regard to any downstream impact on Kansas.87 The
Court rejected both positions, holding that the dispute would be
resolved “upon the basis of equality of rights as to secure as far
as possible to Colorado the benefits of irrigation without
depriving Kansas of the like beneficial effects of a flowing
stream.”88
The Court’s solution in Kansas v. Colorado neatly captured
the unique constitutional design of the original jurisdiction
clause to ensure that each State is treated with dignity. This
concern also drove the Court’s determination that federal
common law, and not the underlying law of either state,
ultimately would govern the dispute. A significant factor that
affected the Court’s analysis was that the two States applied
different—and inconsistent—state law schemes for allocating
private rights from the waters of a river. The Court noted that
“[i]f the two states were absolutely independent nations,” the
dispute “would be settled by treaty or by force,” but because
neither of these methods was possible, the dispute “must be
settled by decision of this court.”89 The resulting inquiry for
resolving such water-apportionment matters, best summarized in
Nebraska v. Wyoming,90 is very broad:

39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 24 Side B

11/15/2017 09:50:50

LINSLEYRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE)

40

11/8/2017 6:08 PM

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

water in the several sections of the river, the character and
rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the
availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful
uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as
compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a
limitation is imposed on the former—these are all relevant
factors. They are merely an illustrative not an exhaustive
catalogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of
apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests
91
which must be made.

Although the Court has made clear that it is making federal
common law in resolving such disputes,92 it looks to numerous
sources as a means of resolving interstate disputes, in an effort
to “recognize the equal rights of both [States] and at the same
time establish justice between them.”93 In Kansas v. Colorado,
the Court held that, depending on the particular case, the Court
considers “[f]ederal law, state law, and international law.”94 As
for international law, although one would expect this to be a
highly valuable source for resolving disputes between States—
which, after all, remain sovereign entities to some degree—the
Court does not resort to such materials as frequently as one
would expect, and generally frames any such references as
simply informing the creation of federal common law.95
More prominently, the Court frequently (but not always)
considers applicable state law in developing a federal common
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 24 Side B
11/15/2017 09:50:50

91. Id. at 618; accord Colo. v. Kan., 320 U.S. 383, 393–94 (1944) (discussing benefits
flowing from increased use of disputed water source, harms likely to result from its
withdrawal, and corresponding harms potentially to be suffered by downstream State, and
also noting that “great and serious caution” is “necessary” when endeavoring to determine
whether each State’s case is proved). This equitable appropriation approach remains the
governing doctrine for “resolving high disputes between sovereigns” by ensuring fair and
evenhanded water divisions. Joshua Patashnik, Arizona v. California and the Equitable
Apportionment of Interstate Waterways, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 43 (2014) (quoting S.C. v.
N.C., 558 U.S. 256, 277 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)) (footnote omitted)).
92. Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (“Equitable apportionment is the doctrine
of federal common law that governs disputes between states concerning their rights to use
the water of an interstate stream.”).
93. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. at 98.
94. Kan. v. Colo., 185 U.S. 125, 146–47 (1902).
95. See Vt. v. N.Y., 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974) (noting that the original jurisdiction
extends to adjudications between States based on “principles of law, some drawn from the
international field, some expressing a ‘common law’ formulated over the decades”); see
also Neb. v. Wyo., 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Colo. v. Kan., 320 U.S. at 393–94.
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law rule to govern an interstate dispute.96 In so doing, the Court
has cautioned that state law is “not to be deemed to have
controlling weight”97—a rule that prevents the inequitable result
of choosing one state’s laws over another’s.98 As the Court
explained in Connecticut v. Massachusetts:
[T]his is not to say that there must be an equal division of
the waters of an interstate stream among the States through
which it flows. It means that the principles of right and
equity shall be applied having regard to the “equal level or
plane on which all the States stand, in point of power and
right, under our constitutional system” and that, upon a
consideration of the pertinent laws of the Contending
states . . . this Court will determine what is an equitable
apportionment of the use of such waters.99

11/15/2017 09:50:50

96. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 107 (noting that state standards may be
relevant despite the existence of federal common law on nuisance).
97. Conn. v. Mass., 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931).
98. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. at 98 (recognizing equal status of States).
99. Conn. v. Mass. 282 U.S. at 670–71 (citation omitted).
100. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. at 98.
101. In Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465, 470 (1922), the Court applied the
doctrine of prior appropriation because both States adhered to that doctrine as a means of
establishing priorities over waters within their boundaries. See also Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S.
at 183–84 (discussing “equable apportionment” and “prior appropriation”); Neb. v. Wyo.,
325 U.S. at 617–18, 622 (discussing “priority of appropriation” and recognizing it as a
“guiding principle for an apportionment” when both States follow the doctrine).
102. See, e.g., Conn. v. Mass., 282 U.S. at 670–71.
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In Kansas v. Colorado, the Court declined to rely on either
of the States’ competing bodies of water law, and instead simply
weighed the relevant factors in a manner designed to “establis[h]
justice” between the States.100 In other interstate water disputes,
the Court has affirmatively adopted state law as the federal
common law rule for the case—most notably where both States
employ the same state-law methodology for apportioning water,
such as the Western water law principle of prior
appropriation.101 The Court also looks to state law where state
law rights may be considered as part of the equitable
apportionment analysis.102 Under these precedents, the Court’s
creation of federal common law is not entirely unbounded, but
takes into account the delicate task of ensuring that each State is
treated with equal dignity before the Court.
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V. PROCEDURES FOR INTERSTATE DISPUTES WITHIN THE
COURT’S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
The same historical and structural concerns that animate the
substance of the Court’s original jurisdiction jurisprudence also
influence the procedures that the Court follows in such cases—
procedures that differ significantly from those governing its
appellate docket.
A. Intervention by Non-State Parties

11/15/2017 09:50:50

103. See generally S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. at 266 (discussing rules developed in earlier
cases).
104. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792).
105. S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. at 266 (citing N.Y. v. Conn., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1 (1799), and
Mo. v. Ill., 180 U.S. at 224–25)).
106. Id. (citing Ariz. v. Cal., 460 U.S. 605, 608, n.1 (1983); Tex. v. N.M., 343 U.S. 932;
N.J. v. City of N.Y., 279 U.S. 823 (1929) (per curiam) (granting motion to add City)).
107. Id. at 265 (citing Md. v. La., 451 U.S. at 745, n.21); see also, e.g., Okla. v. Tex.,
258 U.S. 574, 581, 598 (1922) (involving boundary dispute threatening armed hostilities
with respect to private intervenors’ rights in contested land); Md. v. La., 451 U.S. at 745
n.21 (permitting private corporations to intervene in original-action Commerce Clause
challenge to State’s imposition of allegedly unlawful tax).
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Although the Court certainly could have justified a rule that
only sovereign States could be parties to original jurisdiction
actions brought under the head of Article III, Section 2, for
“controversies between two or more states,” the Court long has
allowed non-State persons or entities to be named as parties to
such actions, in part based on the further provision in Section 2
for suits “between a State and Citizens of another State,” as well
as the general provision for original jurisdiction over cases “in
which a state shall be a party.”103 The practice of allowing such
parties began in 1792 with the Court’s decision in Georgia v.
Brailsford,104 and “for more than two centuries the Court has
exercised that jurisdiction over nonstate parties in suits between
two or more States.”105 Such actions have involved a wide range
of subjects, including claims for equitable apportionment of
water.106
Consistent with this history, the Court also has permitted
non-State parties to intervene in original jurisdiction actions
under appropriate circumstances.107 The Court’s criteria for
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108. Patashnik, supra note 91, at 43.
109. N.J. v. N.Y., 345 U.S. 369, 373 (1953) (denying Philadelphia’s motion to
intervene, on the ground that the city failed to meet its burden to show that Pennsylvania
did not represent its interests); accord S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. at 266–67.
110. Okla. v. Tex., 258 U.S. at 579.
111. Id. at 581.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 580 (discussing receiver’s appointment).
114. Md. v. La., 451 U.S. at 729.
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permitting such intervention have rested heavily on the original
constitutional and historical rationale for original jurisdiction
over controversies between two or more States. Generally, the
Court has narrowly restricted the scope of intervention for nonstate parties in interstate disputes, applying the parens patriae
doctrine to hold that, because a State is deemed to represent the
interests of its citizens, there is no need for such non-State
parties to intervene to protect their own rights.108 When a private
party seeks to intervene in a case in which the intervenor’s home
State is already a party, the intervenor must demonstrate the
necessity for its inclusion and that the State will not adequately
represent its interests: that is, the intervenor must show “some
compelling interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a
class with all other citizens and creatures of the same state,
which interest is not properly represented by the state.”109
In Oklahoma v. Texas, the Court first addressed the issue of
whether non-State party plaintiffs could intervene in interstate
disputes. In that case, the United States had intervened to assert
claims against the party States over a contested river, and the
Court appointed a receiver to take possession of certain disputed
property.110 Various parties then sought to intervene, claiming
rights in the land that the receiver controlled.111 Finding these
claims in conflict with one another and “with the claims of one
or more of the three principal litigants,”112 the Court allowed the
intervention, which it concluded “would permit all possible
claims to the property . . . to be freely and appropriately
asserted” such that no other court could govern the receiver’s
control.113
In Maryland v. Louisiana, the Court allowed several
pipeline companies to intervene in an interstate case that
addressed the constitutionality of Louisiana’s natural gas tax.114
The Court found that the pipeline companies had a “direct stake
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115. Id. at 745 n.21.
116. Id. at 743–45 (discussing tax burden felt by people of states outside Louisiana and
concluding that the case was an “appropriate one for the exercise of our original
jurisdiction under § 1251(b)(2)”).
117. Ariz. v. Cal., 460 U.S. 605, 614–15 (1983) (discussing tribes’ interest).
118. Id. at 615.
119. See, e.g., Tex. v. N.J., 379 U.S. 674, 677, 683 (1965); N.J. v. N.Y., 345 U.S. at 373.
120. N.J. v. N.Y., 345 U.S. at 373.
121. Id.
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in th[e] controversy” and concluded that, “in the interest of a full
exposition of the issues,” it would accept the Special Master’s
recommendation that they be allowed to intervene.115 Although
the private parties’ injuries were identical to that of the State, the
Court did not find that this alignment of interests precluded
intervention.116 And in Arizona v. California, where Native
American tribes sought leave to intervene, the Court found that
the tribes were “entitled to take their place as independent
qualified members of the modern body politic,”117 despite the
State’s claim that the intervention—insofar as it would permit
claims by the tribes against the States—would compromise the
State’s sovereign immunity protected by the Eleventh
Amendment and not waived as part of the original Article III
provision for resolving disputes between the States
themselves.118
In some other original jurisdiction cases, the Court has
found that the putative intervenors lacked the requisite
independent interest.119 In New Jersey v. New York, the Court
denied a motion by the city of Philadelphia to intervene in a
dispute in which New Jersey challenged a diversion by New
York of the waters of the Delaware River, holding that the City
had not met its burden to show that Pennsylvania would not
adequately represent its interest and that it had a “compelling
interest” in its own right.120 The Court explained that it would be
unworkable to permit each municipality that might have an
interest in the matter to become a party: “If we undertook to
evaluate all the separate interests within Pennsylvania, we could,
in effect, be drawn into an intramural dispute over the
distribution of water within the Commonwealth.”121
In South Carolina v. North Carolina—in which South
Carolina sought an equitable apportionment of the waters of the
Catawba River—the Court denied leave for the City of Charlotte
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to intervene as a defendant, but permitted two other parties to do
so.122 As a municipality of North Carolina and a beneficiary of
its alleged water use, Charlotte was adequately represented by
North Carolina,123 which shared Charlotte’s interest in ensuring
that the city received water.124 By contrast, the Court allowed
intervention by Duke Energy, which had eleven power plants
along the river, with accompanying dams, on both sides of the
state boundary and necessarily would be involved in any
resulting allocation plan.125 The Court also allowed intervention
by a bi-state municipal entity that also had operations on both
sides of the state boundary.126 The Court found that these parties
had strong interests in the outcome of the dispute that were not
aligned with those of either of the two party States.127
B. Requirement to Seek Leave
The existence of a dispute between States does not
automatically warrant the exercise of the Court’s original
jurisdiction. The complaining State must seek leave from the
Court to file a bill of complaint, and in so doing must meet
certain threshold requirements. Before filing an initial pleading,
a complaining State invokes the Court’s original jurisdiction by
making a motion for leave to file in the Court.128 For the case to
commence, the motion must be approved by a majority of the
Justices. When deciding whether to grant the motion for leave to
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 27 Side A
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122. S.C. v. N.C., 558 U.S. at 267–74 (discussing potential intervenors’ individual
situations).
123. Id. at 274 (“Charlotte is a municipality of North Carolina, and for purposes of this
litigation, its transfers of water from the Catawba River basin constitute part of North
Carolina’s equitable share. . . . Charlotte, therefore, occupies a class of affected North
Carolina users of water, and the magnitude of Charlotte’s authorized transfer does not
distinguish it in kind from other members of the class.” (citations omitted)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 268–73.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 271, 273 (holding that “neither State [had] sufficient interest . . . to represent
the full scope of the [municipal entity’s] interests,” and that the “importance” and
“relevance” of Duke Energy’s interests indicated that they “should be represented by a
party,” but that “neither State [was] situated to do so properly”).
128. SUP. CT. R. 17(3) (providing that “[t]he initial pleading [in an action invoking the
Court’s original jurisdiction] shall be preceded by a motion for leave to file, and may be
accompanied by a brief in support of the motion”).
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file, the Court considers several important requirements, which
largely follow from the “grave and delicate” nature of the
jurisdiction and the corresponding need to exercise it
sparingly.129
First, the complaining State must establish standing to
bring the action against the defendant State or States. It does so
by showing “a direct interest of its own” and “not merely
seeking recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real
parties in interest.”130 As Maryland v. Louisiana demonstrates,
for example, the State “may act as the representative of its
citizens in original actions” when the injury “affects the general
population of a State in substantial way.”131 In that case, the
Court held that the plaintiff States could sue for the injury to
their citizens’ property interests as a result of an alleged
unconstitutional tax imposition.132 The Court reasoned that the
States had a broad interest “in protecting [their] citizens from
substantial economic injury” because the citizens could not
bring suit in Louisiana.133 Although the need to establish
standing may preclude some types of interstate claims, the Court
has recognized standing for interstate disputes over boundaries,
pollution, tax, and—as this article itself demonstrates—water
allocation.134
Second, the Court imposes a heightened pleading standard
that must be met before it “exercise[s] its extraordinary power
under the Constitution to control the conduct of one [sovereign]
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 27 Side B
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129. See Miss. v. La., 506 U.S. at 76–77.
130. Kan. v. Colo., 533 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2001) (indicating that injury to Kansas as a State
gave it standing to bring an action against Colorado for water disputes rooted in the
Arkansas River Compact).
131. Md. v. La., 451 U.S. at 737 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 739.
133. Id. (pointing out that “individual consumers cannot be expected to litigate . . .
given that the amounts paid by each consumer are likely to be relatively small”).
134. See, e.g., Mont. v. Wyo., 563 U.S. 368, 375 (2011) (involving dispute over
appropriation of water under a compact); Ala. v. N.C., 560 U.S. 330, 338 (2010) (involving
dispute over a compact addressing storage of low-level radioactive waste); Wyo. v. Okla.,
502 U.S. at 452 (involving effects on Wyoming coal-severance-tax receipts of Oklahoma
statute requiring power plants located in Oklahoma to burn a specific percentage of coal
mined in Oklahoma); Ohio v. Ky., 410 U.S. 641, 652 (1973) (involving boundary dispute
over the Ohio River).
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state at the suit of another.”135 This standard creates a much
higher burden for the complaining State than would apply in a
private suit between individuals.136 Among other things, the
Court will not grant leave unless “the threatened injury is clearly
shown to be of serious magnitude and imminent.”137
Third, even if the complaining State meets these minimum
prerequisites, the Court still may refuse to entertain the action.
As noted above, the Court has refused to exercise its original
jurisdiction even in cases within its exclusive, original
jurisdiction, where the requisite “seriousness and dignity of the
claim” was lacking.138 In addition, because of the Court’s
limited resources, the Court considers whether the issue can
appropriately be litigated in an alternative forum.139 The Court
may choose to send the case to a district court, provided that it
involves a federal question.140 Yet, even when the parties do not
have access to another forum in which to litigate, the Court still
may use its discretion on a case-by-case basis to deny leave to
file an original action.141
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135. N.D. v. Minn., 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923) (holding in an interstate water dispute
that Minnesota’s construction of drainage ditches and straightening of a river channel was
not responsible for floods affecting North Dakota) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See id.
137. Ala. v. Ariz., 291 U.S. 286, 292 (1934) (determining that the amended bill did not
meet the requirements to grant leave).
138. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93, 108 (declining to exercise original jurisdiction
because the claim at issue lacked “seriousness and dignity,” and “remit[ting] the parties to
an appropriate district court whose powers are adequate to resolve the issues” (footnote
omitted)); see also Wyandotte Chemicals, 401 U.S. at 495 (concluding that although case
falls within original jurisdiction, the Court “should nevertheless decline to exercise”
original jurisdiction); Mass. v. Mo., 308 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1939) (declining to exercise
original jurisdiction over a matter involving state taxes, finding that another proper and
adequate remedy was available); Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The
Supreme Court’s Management of Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L.
REV. 185, 190 (1993) (noting that the Court rejected fifty State-party cases between
October 1, 1961, and April 25, 1993, and provided only nine published opinions explaining
its reasons for refusing to hear most of them).
139. Ariz. v. N.M., 425 U.S. at 797 (finding that state court action provided an
“appropriate forum” in which to resolve the controversy).
140. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 105 (indicating that the “question of apportionment
of interstate waters is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon which state statutes or
decisions are not conclusive”).
141. Miss. v. La., 506 U.S. at 76 (recognizing that original jurisdiction is to be exercised
only sparingly and with discretion); see also Wyandotte Chemicals, 401 U.S. at 495.
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142. Neb. v. Wyo., 507 U.S. 584, 591 (1993); see also Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S. at 187
n.13 (discussing burden of proof); Conn. v. Mass., 282 U.S. at 669; N.Y. v. N.J., 256 U.S.
296, 309 (1921).
143. Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S. at 187.
144. Id. at 189–90 (remanding for further findings).
145. Mo. v. Ill., 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906) (using this characterization in a case in which
the bill was dismissed after trial because Missouri failed to meet the standard of proof).
146. Colo. v. N.M., 459 U.S. at 187.
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Even if a State succeeds in invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction and establishing its case by a preponderance of the
evidence, the complaining State is not necessarily assured a
victory in the form of a decree. Based upon the same delicate
sovereign interests that may cause the Court to decline to
entertain an original jurisdiction action between States, the
Court may decline to enter a decree in such an action, even
where one State seemingly has proven its case. This is
particularly true in equitable apportionment cases involving
interstate waters, where the requested decree normally would
take the form of an order enjoining the defendant State from
certain uses or actions with respect to the disputed waters. The
Court has stated that, at a minimum, the complaining State must
establish “proof by clear and convincing evidence of some real
and substantial injury or damage.”142 But even a showing of
such injury may not be enough to warrant a decree from the
Court. Rather, before the Court will exercise its extraordinary
powers to enjoin a State’s actions, it must also be shown that the
“countervailing equities” that benefit the defendant State do not
“justify the detriment to existing users” in the complaining
State.143 The complaining State must demonstrate, with “clear
and convincing evidence,” a substantial injury caused by the
other State, such as “unreasonably wasteful” use,144 such that the
Court would be prepared to defend its decree “against all
considerations on the other side.”145 And the defendant State
may prove that the benefits of its uses or proposed uses of water
“substantially outweigh the harm[s]” alleged by the complaining
State, in which case no decree will issue.146
The Court’s decision in Kansas v. Colorado illustrates this
point and also the degree to which the Court is reluctant to
intervene in a way that will disrupt the balance of sovereign
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interests between States. As discussed above, this case resulted
in the first expression of the Court’s doctrine of equitable
apportionment with respect to interstate waters.147 After a trial,
the Court agreed with Kansas that the “diminution of the flow of
water in the river by the irrigation of Colorado has worked some
detriment to the southwestern part of Kansas.”148 Nonetheless,
the Court found that comparing the amount of detriment to
Kansas with the “great benefit” to Colorado led to the
conclusion that “equality of right and equity between the two
states forbids any interference with the present withdrawal of
water in Colorado for the purposes of irrigation.”149 The Court
made much the same point in its later decision in Colorado v.
Kansas:

In Connecticut v. Massachusetts, the Court again displayed
a reluctance to disrupt the status quo between two sovereign
States by issuing a coercive decree. Connecticut had challenged
a plan by Massachusetts to divert waters of the Connecticut
River, claiming that the diversion plan inevitably would harm
Connecticut’s agriculture and hydropower capabilities.151 After
taking jurisdiction and holding a full trial on the merits—and
also making findings that agreed with many of the assertions

11/15/2017 09:50:50

147. See text accompanying notes 85–89, supra.
148. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. at 113–14.
149. Id. at 114.
150. Colo. v. Kan., 320 U.S. at 393–94 (footnote omitted).
151. Conn. v. Mass., 282 U.S. at 663–67 (setting out facts alleged by Connecticut and
findings of special master).
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[I]n such disputes as this, the court is conscious of the great
and serious caution with which it is necessary to approach
the inquiry whether a case is proved. Not every matter
which would warrant resort to equity by one citizen against
another would justify our interference with the action of a
state, for the burden on the complaining state is much
greater than that generally required to be borne by private
parties. Before the court will intervene the case must be of
serious magnitude and fully and clearly proved. And in
determining whether one state is using, or threatening to
use, more than its equitable share of the benefits of a
stream, all the factors which create equities in favor of one
state or the other must be weighed as of the date when the
150
controversy is mooted.
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Connecticut had made—the Court ultimately dismissed the bill
of complaint because Connecticut had not offered “clear and
convincing” evidence of serious injury so as to provide the
Court a warrant to “exert its extraordinary power to control the
conduct of one State at the suit of another.”152
Similar factors affected the outcome in Missouri v. Illinois.
Although the Court granted leave to file the action—thereby
establishing the principle that a State may bring an original
action in a parens patriae capacity153—the Court ultimately
found that Missouri had failed to meet the high bar for the
Court’s original jurisdiction. Missouri had complained of the
alleged discharge of Chicago sewage that sent “poisonous filth
daily into the Mississippi,”154 but the Court found that the river
experienced “no visible increase of filth” and “no new smell,”
further noting the unlikelihood that the Court would have found
this “a nuisance of the simple kind” known to the “older
common law.”155 The Court also considered whether the alleged
contamination appeared to have any effect on year-over-year
statistics tracking the number of typhoid-fever cases in St. Louis
and independent research into the ability of the bacteria to travel
through the river.156 Because the factual findings introduced by
the two States made “the case weaker in principle as well as
harder to prove,” the Court ultimately dismissed the bill.157
V. THE COURT’S RELIANCE ON SPECIAL MASTERS

11/15/2017 09:50:50

152. Id. at 666–67, 669; see also Colo. v. N.M., 467 U.S. 310, 319, 320 (1984)
(determining that Colorado failed to meet its burden of demonstrating injury by providing
only “generalizations” and “mere assertions”).
153. See text accompanying notes 65–67, supra.
154. Mo. v. Ill., 200 U.S. at 517.
155. Id. at 522.
156. Id. at 523–25.
157. Id. at 526.
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Because the Court has limited resources that are not well
suited to the day-to-day activities of a trial court, it typically
delegates the initial management of an original jurisdiction case,
as well as the development of the factual record and initial
findings of fact and law. In early original jurisdiction cases, the
Court sometimes appointed a commissioner to assist with these
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duties,158 including by taking testimony from witnesses.159 In the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court appointed
commissioners to assume the task of enforcing judicial decrees,
specifically those involving state boundaries.160
Over the years, the Court expanded its use of third parties
to assist in managing original cases. In 1908, the Court created
the office of the Special Master, through which the Court could
designate individual Special Masters for specific cases to assist
its decisionmaking by making initial factual findings and legal
conclusions.161 Since then, the scope of the authority wielded by
Special Masters has expanded to include hearing evidence,
developing the case record, and issuing a report to the Court.162
In so doing, a Special Master often interprets compacts and
other relevant documents and precedents, and makes
recommendations as to any appropriate disposition or relief.163
The Special Master also is authorized to “fix the time and
conditions” for the filing of pleadings, to direct proceedings and
summon witnesses, and to issue subpoenas,164 and to entertain
motions and preside over trials.165 In some cases, a Special
Master may take years to prepare a case for review by the Court,
amassing a substantial and lengthy record, including expert
testimony on technical or scientific matters.166 In the seminal
original jurisdiction case of Arizona v. California, the litigation
lasted for decades and the trial lasted for two years.167
39639-aap_18-1 Sheet No. 30 Side A
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158. See, e.g., Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. 401, 401 (1791) (appointing
commissioners in the first original jurisdiction case filed in the Supreme Court).
159. See id. (indicating that the commissioners were to “examine witnesses in
Holland”).
160. See Carstens, supra note 29, at 643.
161. See Va. v. W. Va., 209 U.S. 514, 534–37 (1908) (ordering that case be referred to
a Special Master to report factual findings to the Court).
162. See, e.g., Vt. v. N.H., 282 U.S. 796, 796 (1930).
163. See e.g., Okla. v. N.M., 501 U.S. 221, 221 (1991) (remanding to Master for further
proceedings to be followed by recommendations on the merits).
164. See e.g., Neb. v. Iowa, 379 U.S. 996, 996 (1965) (describing authority given to the
Special Master and allowing him to recover expenses).
165. See, e.g., Ariz. v. Cal., 466 U.S. 144, 144 (1984) (approving Special Master’s
recommendation that additional parties be permitted to intervene).
166. See, e.g., N.J. v. Del., 552 U.S. 597, 608 (2008) (observing that the Special Master
“carefully considered nearly 6,500 pages of materials presented by the parties”).
167. Ariz. v. Cal., 373 U.S. 546, 551 (1963) (noting that, in the course of the two-year
trial, “340 witnesses were heard orally or by deposition, thousands of exhibits were
received, and 25,000 pages of transcript were filled”); see also Ariz. v. Cal., 531 U.S. 1
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After collecting the evidence and examining the applicable
law, the Special Master prepares and submits a report of
findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Court for de
novo review.168 Any party to the action may challenge the
Special Master’s report by filing exceptions to all or part of the
findings,169 a process that requires the parties to select their
strongest available arguments.170 The Court may sustain or
overrule the exceptions and either reject or adopt the Special
Master’s report in whole or in part. The Court also may remand
the case to the Special Master to take additional evidence.171
And although the Court has no obligation to defer to any aspect
of the Special Master’s report, certainly there have been cases
where the Court has appeared to do so.172
Some commentators have criticized aspects of the Court’s
use of Special Masters, including the lack of transparency in the
process by which Special Masters are appointed, the impropriety
of deference to decisionmakers who are not subject to the
Constitutional appointment process, and the absence of rules
governing the manner in which Special Masters conduct
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(2000) (entering final supplemental decree filed after motion to re-open was granted in
Ariz. v. Cal., 493 U.S. 866 (1989)).
168. See, e.g., Vt. v. N.H., 282 U.S. at 796 (indicating that any “findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the special master shall be subject to consideration, revision, or
approval by the Court”).
169. See, e.g., U.S. v. La., 485 U.S. 88, 89 (1988) (overruling exceptions by the State of
Mississippi that would have expanded the scope of the litigation); Stuart A. Raphael,
Practical Considerations in Original Action Litigation: Virginia v. Maryland and New
Jersey v. Delaware, 12 WYO. L. REV. 15, 22 (2012) (noting that, in light of word limits on
exceptions, “a state that loses an argument before the Special Master may be forced to
abandon it when choosing the best issues to raise on exceptions”); see also id. at 22–23
(discussing consequences of issue choice and assessing outcome in an illustrative case).
170. One group of commentators has observed that the standard appointment order for a
Special Master authorizes “fairly extensive powers,” including broad discretion in
“conduct[ing] the proceedings.” Jeffrey L. Bleich et al., Supreme Court Watch: Very
Special Masters—Handling the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 35 S.F.
ATT’Y 45, 47–48 (2009).
171. See Okla. v. N.M., 501 U.S. at 221.
172. In Virginia v. Maryland and New Jersey v. Delaware, for example, the Court
appointed the same Special Master. See N.J. v. Del., 552 U.S. at 617 (referring to Special
Master Ralph I. Lancaster, Jr.); Va. v. Md., 540 U.S. 56, 64 (2003) (same). The Special
Master analyzed and reconciled the differences in the two cases in his recommendations,
which the Court found persuasive, noting that “both original actions were referred to” Mr.
Lancaster in his capacity as Special Master. N.J. v. Del., 552 U.S. at 617.
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proceedings.173 But in the end it is the Court that ultimately
determines the facts and law in any original jurisdiction case,
and the Court certainly is free to develop its own procedures for
developing the record that will allow it to make those
determinations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although original jurisdiction cases rarely generate the
kind of national press that attends other categories of cases, the
Court’s role in resolving controversies between States remains a
vital feature of our constitutional government. Having given up
aspects of their sovereignty to become part of a federalist
government, the States need a means of resolving their disputes
in an evenhanded way that respects the residual sovereignty of
each State. The Court’s jurisprudence in original cases under
Article III has consistently reflected that fundamental purpose.
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173. See, e.g., Carstens, supra note 29, at 668–69 (characterizing involvement of
Special Masters in original jurisdiction cases as “disquieting,” decrying their acting in “the
absence of either delineated rules or a vast body of precedent,” and expressing concern that
the use of Special Masters can lead to “outcomes that result from processes not in
conformity with the public’s notion of fair adjudication”).

